Starlink vs. Russia: Why SpaceX's Restrictions are Causing Panic Among the Occupiers?

SpaceX, at the request of Ukraine, has implemented restrictions on Starlink terminals, making their use on the country's territory impossible at speeds of 75–90 km/h. This dealt a painful blow to the Russian occupation forces and is already provoking not just annoyed reactions from them, but genuine panic. And not by chance.

When we talk about the threat of Starlink being used by the occupiers, we most often mean the installation of terminals on strike drones, which allowed these means of terror to be controlled in real time. At the same time, the fact that the entire front-line interaction and military communication of the Russian occupation forces were also based on a connection via Starlink was completely ignored.

Official supplies of Starlink terminals and related services to the Russian Federation do not exist – they are prohibited. Therefore, these devices are completely useless on the territory of the aggressor country. But as soon as they appear on the territory of Ukraine or even in border areas, the terminals started working normally, providing the enemy with a stable connection.

Almost all Starlink terminals used in Russia were imported illegally – through smuggling channels. In addition to already being subject to speed restrictions, their normal operation on the territory of Ukraine requires special verification. This means that problems will be faced not only by unregistered terminals moving at speeds above 75 km/h, but also by stationary devices that have not passed the registration procedure.

In other words, all illegal Starlink terminals located with the Russian occupation forces and providing a stable connection along the entire front line will simply stop working at a certain moment.

This is precisely what is already causing panic among the Russian occupiers, significantly greater even than the loss of the ability to control drones in real time. It is a question of the collapse of the entire combined arms communication, based on a reliable means of communication, capable of operating in the most severe weather conditions and for which Russia has no full-fledged analogue. Only the classic combined arms communication, actively used by the Russian troops in 2022, remains – a system that has become a byword for its unreliability and the huge number of cases of "friendly fire".

Starlink and kamikaze drones

From the moment of the appearance of the Iranian kamikaze drones Shahed-136 in the enemy's arsenal, they were constantly improved, modernized and with improved characteristics. This also applied to the possibilities of controlling the drones, including the creation of a reliable communication channel, weakly or not at all susceptible to the effects of electronic warfare (EW).

Initially, attempts were made to add GLONASS blocks in order to expand the area of application and increase accuracy. Russian flight control blocks B-101 or navigation modules "Kometa" were installed in combination with the satellite navigation block "B-105", which are also used in Russian unmanned aerial vehicles such as "Orlan-10", "Forpost-P" and others.

Similar methods for increasing the reliability of the communication channel were also applied to the kamikaze drones "Molniya-2", BM-35 "Italmas", as well as to decoys of the "Gerbera" type.

It was the adaptation of Starlink for controlling kamikaze drones that took Russian terror to a whole new level. Real-time control of the means of destruction made it possible not only to instantly change course, but also for the operator to independently select a target. In addition, these drones were able to strike moving targets, while without real-time control they posed a threat mainly to stationary objects.

Today, however, the level of this threat is beginning to decline. More precisely – it is returning one generation back and approaching the level from the beginning of 2025.

This does not mean underestimating the threat from kamikaze drones as a means of terror, but it significantly limits their functionality and the possibilities for use by the enemy, as well as increases the probability of interception of targets that move along pre-set coordinates, receiving commands in stages and again becoming vulnerable to the effects of EW.

Starlink analogue

Literally two weeks ago, the OBOZ.UA article "In Russia, the project for a Starlink analogue failed: why the capabilities of the space 'superpower' were 'zeroed out' and what follows" described the situation around the failure of the Russian satellite program "Rassvet".

Russia is not trying for the first time to create a Starlink analogue. Before "Rassvet", the "Sfera" project existed, but neither of them was implemented. At the same time, SpaceX's satellite armada in orbit already exceeds 9,600 units.

Russia will never be able to catch up with SpaceX in the race to provide global space communications and create a competitive Starlink analogue.

After the completion of the verification period of the Starlink terminals, Russian combined arms communication will suffer a collapse. The Russian occupation forces will be forced either to return to outdated means of communication, or to seek temporary solutions with the help of allied countries, for example, China. But these will be precisely temporary measures, since they will not find a full-fledged replacement for Starlink.

Conclusion

Restricting Starlink will deal a serious blow not only to the ability of the Russian occupation forces to carry out terror against rear Ukraine with kamikaze drones, but also to the entire communication system on the front line.

Of course, the occupiers will look for ways to circumvent these restrictions – even the use of hacker groups to break into the Starlink verification is not excluded. But the essence is in something else: this will already be a reaction to an irreversible process that systematically limits Russia's communication capabilities.

And however paradoxical it may sound, today we are witnessing how the "great space superpower" failed to create its own satellite armada in orbit, while on the battlefield against Ukraine it relied precisely on Western communication technologies.