Europe has increasingly advanced air and missile defense, but it cannot be viewed as a completely impenetrable shield. Modern systems include radars, surveillance satellites, early warning and command aircraft, as well as complexes with varying ranges such as "Aegis," "Patriot," and "SAMP/T".
The experience of the 12-day war between Israel and Iran in June 2025 showed that even the most modern defense can be put under serious strain during massive attacks. Iran's strikes revealed the limitations of Israel's "Iron Dome" system and multilayered missile defense when faced with a large number of missiles, drones, and tactical saturation assets.
A similar scenario in Europe could have a significant political and psychological effect, even if material damage were limited. Successfully breaching part of the air defense would demonstrate vulnerability and intensify public tension.
The more likely risk is hybrid
The most immediate danger for European nations is not necessarily a direct missile or drone attack. More realistic are actions through proxies, cyberattacks, infrastructure sabotage, covert operations, disinformation campaigns, and the use of social media influence networks.
A direct attack by Iran with missiles or drones against an American base in Southern Europe would have a high political cost for Tehran. Such a strike could quickly provoke a strong military response from the US and activate NATO's solidarity mechanisms.
Covert operations, actions via third parties, and cyber sabotage, however, provide strategic ambiguity. With these types of attacks, identifying the perpetrator is more difficult, and the risk of an immediate military response is lower.
In Europe, cases of hostile Iranian activity have already been identified, related to pressure against political opponents of the regime, intelligence operations, industrial espionage, and cyber activity. European institutions also warn of the use of criminal networks as intermediaries in actions against individuals or groups viewed by Tehran as a threat.
Undersea cables as a vulnerable link
Among the potential targets are also undersea communication cables. According to information from the "Financial Times," Iran had considered the possibility of actions against American facilities in Southeast Europe, including in Bulgaria, as well as against undersea fiber-optic cables in the Strait of Hormuz in the event of an escalation. [1128]
The cables around the Strait of Hormuz are important for connections between the Persian Gulf states, Asia, and Europe. The simultaneous cutting of several routes could seriously disrupt regional communications and create additional risks for financial and trade exchanges.
For Europe, undersea infrastructure is of key importance for internet services, data centers, banking operations, government and military communications, energy, and international trade. Protecting it is a complex task, as the seabed covers vast areas and cannot be monitored constantly without significant technological capacity.
Not a "second Russia," but a different risk
Iran should not be placed in the same category as Russia regarding capabilities for conventional war against Europe. Russia possesses a massive military potential that allows for direct operations against neighboring European states and includes a wide range of assets, including tactical nuclear weapons.
Iran does not have the same capacity for a direct military conflict with Europe. However, it could combine missile or drone threats, cyberattacks, sabotage, covert operations, political destabilization, and economic pressure through the Strait of Hormuz. It is precisely the combination of these tools that would complicate the political and military response of European states.
Time to prepare
NATO has significantly changed its approach to air defense since the start of the war in Ukraine. The current strategy includes protection against drones, cruise and ballistic missiles, electronic warfare, and cyber threats, relying on a multilayered and redundant defense system.
The Alliance has more advanced intelligence and early warning mechanisms compared to the period ten years ago. Nevertheless, Europe still lacks sufficient air and missile defense systems to cover all critical infrastructure, and ammunition stocks could prove limited in the event of a prolonged or massive attack.
Crucial will be the quality of technical and human intelligence, rapid information sharing, and coordination between military structures, internal security, civilian and military intelligence, cyber defense, and critical infrastructure protection services.