Officially, Bulgaria enters 2026 as a full member of the Eurozone and with an unprecedented change of head of state – the Constitutional Court accepts the resignation of Rumen Radev, and Vice President Iliana Yotova takes over the functions of president until the end of the term. On paper, this looks like a controlled constitutional procedure. In reality, however, the political system resembles a stage on which the spotlights shine, but there is no director and no clear scenario.
Change at the top and a silent parliament
The situation in which the state simultaneously changes the top of the institution "president" and remains with a parliament unable to gather a quorum is more than symbolic. While the Constitutional Court formalizes Radev's departure and the transfer of powers to Yotova, the National Assembly is blocked - no budget is accepted, no key laws for the Eurozone and anti-corruption changes.
Thus, Bulgaria enters the most important stage of its reforms without a fully-fledged representative power. The European Union expects the fulfillment of commitments - from fiscal rules to judicial reform - and the political process is stalling. As a result, the state looks like a strange hybrid: high symbolism, low manageability.
Radev: from arbiter to polarizing player
Radev is not just leaving the post - he clearly states his intention to stay in politics and participate in the party field. This turns him from an institutional arbiter into an active player who will try to monetize the accumulated rating and anti-elite rhetoric in a new political project.
Thus, the "vacuum" at the top is filled not by an impartial figure, but by a person who enters directly into the political clash. For the fragmented field, this means even stronger polarization. In the context of EU membership and the Eurozone, such a move carries a risk: instead of a stabilizing center, the state receives a new source of tension.
Institutional triangle without a face
The combination of acting president, a caretaker government/technocratic cabinet and a parliament that often does not work creates an institutional triangle with blurred responsibility. Formally, there is power, but in practice there is a lack of political will to take on difficult decisions - for the budget, for the tax and pension system, for the real implementation of commitments to the Eurozone.
This model concentrates executive power with minimal democratic accountability. At a time when society expects answers about prices, incomes and corruption, the political elite prefers to "get through" the crisis with temporary regimes. This is the opposite of the European logic of predictability and strong, but controlled institutions.
The street as a parallel institution
The paralysis of the parliament naturally intensifies the pressure from the street. The protests of civil movements in front of court buildings and the prosecutor's office, the campaigns for the replacement of key magistrates and for deep anti-corruption reform show that the energy from the mass protests of 2025 has not disappeared, but is being redirected to point, but insistent actions.
In the eyes of many citizens, the street is becoming a more authentic source of legitimacy than the plenary hall. Thus, a sense of "dual power" arises – formal, in the institutions, and moral, in public pressure. In the long run, this is a dangerous signal: if representative democracy cannot channel the protest energy into sustainable solutions, a field opens for radical and populist projects.
Anti-corruption "reloading" or dismantling
Particularly worrying is the fact that in the midst of the institutional vacuum, sensitive changes are being made in the anti-corruption architecture. The closure or deep reformatting of the existing commission and the scattering of its functions among different bodies may lead not to strengthening, but to the actual dismantling of the already weak control.
In the absence of a stable majority and broad consensus, the risk is obvious: instead of a more effective fight against corruption, the country will be left with a more blurred, more difficult to control and more susceptible to political pressure anti-corruption regime. This is in direct conflict with the EU's expectations for increased oversight of public resources in the Eurozone.
The euro as a backdrop to the vacuum
Bulgaria is already in the Eurozone – legally and technically the process is irreversible. But the symbolism is heavy: the change of currency coincides with a political crisis, an unstable budgetary process and deep distrust of the elites. Such a scenario is rare in the history of the euro club, where new members usually enter with clear majorities and stable governments.
The euro alone cannot compensate for the deficit of trust. If citizens associate the new currency not with stability and lower credit costs, but with chaos, speculation and political turmoil, the pro-European consensus will be undermined. Thus, the "vacuum of day X" becomes a stress test not only for the economy, but also for public support for European integration.
When the crisis becomes the norm
Perhaps the biggest risk is not day X itself, but that it fits into a long series of elections, caretaker and technical cabinets and repeated protests. Instability is becoming a backdrop to which society is accustomed. When "crisis" becomes the normal state, the belief that democracy can ensure sustainable governance begins to erode.
This is where space opens up for more radical, populist or pro-Russian projects that promise "order" and a "strong hand" at the cost of democratic concessions. From a pro-European point of view, the real question is not only how to fill the vacuum of day X, but how to break the spiral of chronic instability and restore the trust that the European model of predictable, responsible and controllable power is possible in Bulgaria.