Judicial reform is back at the top of the political agenda. The new government has set as a key priority the replacement of the "Supreme Judicial Council" (SJC), the strengthening of judicial independence, and the limiting of influence over the prosecutor's office. The question, however, remains the same as it has for the last fifteen years: can the rulers actually break the web of dependencies in the judicial system, or will they limit themselves to cosmetic changes?
The context is unfavorable. According to Transparency International's "Corruption Perceptions Index" for 2024, Bulgaria receives only 43 points out of 100 and remains among the worst-performing countries in the EU. Parallel studies by non-governmental organizations show that more than a third of citizens have directly encountered corrupt pressure, and the share of people who believe that corruption remains unpunished consistently exceeds 70%.
Where is the core of the crisis: the SJC and the prosecutor's office
Formally, the SJC should be a guarantee for the independence of the judiciary. In practice, for years it has been perceived as a body where decisions are often made under invisible pressure – political, corporate, or clan-based. The appointment and dismissal of chief prosecutors such as "Ivan Geshev" and "Borislav Sarafov," accompanied by public scandals and sharp shifts in majorities, showed that key votes can be turned around without clear motives, and refusals to act can be just as significant as the decisions themselves.
In parallel, the prosecutor's office is consistently pointed out in international and local reports as an institution with excessively concentrated powers and weak accountability. Analyses indicate a persistent imbalance: while hundreds of thousands of citizens and companies admit to participating in corrupt practices, real conviction sentences for corruption are measured in the hundreds annually – a gap that fuels the feeling of impunity.
The informal network: dependencies that are not visible in the law
The crisis does not end with formal institutions. An informal network of influence has grown in the judicial system, based on family, professional, and career dependencies. Local administrative heads have decisive power over promotions, secondments, and the workload of magistrates. Thus, anyone who wants to advance is motivated to be "loyal" – not so much to the law, but to those who hold the career levers.
This network also manifests in the elections for the professional quota in the SJC. Voting by courts and prosecutors' offices allows local leaderships to "arrange" the results through direct or indirect pressure, which many jurists compare to a corporate vote. Reform-minded magistrates have repeatedly signaled that the campaign for the SJC is often conducted not with ideas, but with promises of loyalty and backroom deals.
What do the rulers propose: first steps or half-measures?
In the spring of 2026, the ruling majority submitted draft bills for changes to the "Judicial System Act," which provide for new rules for the election of the SJC, the introduction of the possibility for the Minister of Justice to appeal decisions of the council before an administrative court, as well as restrictions on the personnel decisions of the current composition whose mandate has expired.
Reformers are insisting on a kind of moratorium on the powers of the incumbent SJC to make appointments and reappointments until a new composition is elected. The idea is to prevent the "concreting" of key positions by a body whose legitimacy is called into question due to its expired mandate. According to legal experts, this is an important but temporary measure – without a subsequent change in the way the council is formed, the risk of reproducing the same dependencies remains.
The election of a new SJC: a test of political will
The key question is how the new SJC will be elected. For some of the constitutional amendments related to the status and mandate of the council, 160 votes are needed – a qualified majority that requires agreement between the rulers and at least part of the opposition. The plan is for the legislative changes to be adopted by the summer to start the procedure, but the constitutional stage could prove to be much more difficult.
An additional risk is posed by controversial ideas about the voting method – for example, holding the elections for the SJC only with paper ballots instead of electronic voting, which critics define as a step backward in terms of transparency. The sponsors explain that this is a technical necessity, but the suspicion remains that such a decision could facilitate vote manipulation in small collectives.
Impunity as a litmus test: what the statistics show
Whether the reform works will be measured not by the number of laws passed, but by the extent to which the practice of impunity for corruption and abuse of power is interrupted. The data so far is alarming. With hundreds of thousands of citizens and companies involved at least once a year in a corrupt deal, the number of final convictions for corruption remains symbolic against the backdrop of the scale of the problem.
This gap between the scale of corruption and the number of those punished cannot be filled only by changes in the law. More active investigations, bolder prosecutors, and judges who are not afraid to touch "untouchable" figures are needed. Legal experts warn that if the only change is the replacement of the rulers without changing practices in the prosecutor's office and the courts, corruption indices will not improve significantly.
What else is needed for real reform?
Along with the changes in the SJC, a number of experts suggest additional, deeper steps:
– Limiting the concentration of administrative and budgetary powers in the SJC – for example, transferring part of the management of buildings, property, IT systems, and public procurement to the "Ministry of Justice" in order to reduce the "capital" of influence in a single body.
– Reviewing the status of the prosecutor's office – for years, the idea has been discussed of taking it out of the judicial power and placing it under clearer democratic control within the executive power, with clear guarantees against political pressure. Even without an immediate constitutional change, the election of members of the prosecutorial college in the SJC from among jurists outside the acting prosecutor's office would limit corporate solidarity.
– Mandatory expanded declarations for family and professional relationships between magistrates, with a ban on related persons being in direct hierarchical dependence or in the same judicial panel – a measure aimed at reducing internal "clan" dependencies.
– Stricter and effectively applied rules for disciplinary liability of magistrates, including for unexplained delays of cases, refusal to provide motives, and suspicions of conflict of interest. Currently, quite a few key acts are issued far after legal deadlines without this leading to consequences.
The political cost of true reform
True judicial reform is not a technical operation, but a political conflict – between the interests of the networks that profit from the status quo and the public expectation for justice. The rulers will have to decide whether they are ready to endure strong pressure – media, economic, and intra-party – in the name of long-term change.
By summer, the first concrete steps are expected to be taken – changing the composition of the SJC, electing a new inspectorate, and adopting the first legislative packages. But whether this will be the beginning of cleaning up dependencies or the start of another "controlled reform" will become clear from three things: what kind of people are chosen, how major corruption cases are investigated, and whether society sees a real reduction in impunity.
For now, the answer to the question "can the rulers reform the judicial system" is cautious: they have the tools and the public mandate, but success will depend on their willingness to go beyond comfortable compromises and affect precisely those networks that, until now, have turned all attempts at reform into a facade.